Bank busting figures as profits pile up!

Banks' profits surge

Banks are reporting unusually strong profits because higher interest rates have widened margins, while slow pass‑through to savers, cost‑cutting, and capital optimisation have amplified returns — even as credit risks begin to rise.

Why profits are so high

The latest figures show that UK banks are still benefiting from the long tail of the interest‑rate cycle.

Even though the Bank of England has not raised rates since August 2023, the base rate remains at 4.5%, allowing lenders to earn significantly more on mortgages and credit than they pay out on deposits.

This margin expansion has been the single biggest driver of profit growth. Research from recently highlighted from Positive Money shows that the UK’s four largest banks have generated £136.8 billion in pre‑tax profits since rate rises began in December 2021, and are on track to exceed their record £45.9 billion made in 2024 by around 14% in 2025.

A second factor is the government’s interest payments on central bank reserves. Because commercial banks are paid the base rate on their risk‑free deposits at the Bank of England, they stand to receive around £30 billion a year in transfers through to 2030 — effectively a public subsidy that boosts earnings without requiring additional lending.

Banks have also been aggressively returning capital to shareholders. Between 2022 and 2024, the big four spent £42 billion on dividends and £32 billion on share buybacks, reinforcing the perception that profits are being harvested rather than reinvested.

How banks are sustaining these profits

The profitability story is not just about rates. Structural shifts are helping banks defend margins even as the rate cycle turns.

1. Slow deposit repricing High Street banks have been reluctant to raise savings rates in line with market levels. As consumers move deposits to specialist lenders offering better returns, the big banks still retain a large, low‑cost funding base.

KPMG reportedly notes that high street banks’ share of deposits has only slipped from 84% in 2019 to 80% in 2024 — still dominant enough to preserve cheap funding.

2. Capital optimisation through securitisation Banks are increasingly using Significant Risk Transfer (SRT) securitisations to free up capital and improve return on equity. Securitised loan volumes have grown at a 4% CAGR between 2022 and 2025, allowing banks to recycle capital into higher‑yielding assets.

3. Cost discipline and digital transformation With margins expected to compress as rates eventually fall, banks are pushing cost‑cutting, automation, and AI‑driven process redesign.

KPMG reportedly forecasts sector‑wide returns on equity could fall from 18% in 2023 to 10% by 2027 without structural change — making efficiency programmes essential to sustaining profitability.

The emerging risk: impairments

Barclays’ latest results show rising credit impairment charges, including an £823 million provision linked to mortgage‑market stress and fraud‑related losses.

This raises the question of whether the credit cycle is turning. If impairments rise across the sector, the profit boom could fade.

The biggest emerging credit risks sit outside the banking system and that is private credit, leveraged borrowers, and liquidity mismatches that could spill back into banks.

Private credit is now large, interconnected, and showing signs of strain. Rising defaults, deteriorating loan quality, and withdrawal caps at major funds point to mounting stress. Defaults could climb sharply, with Morgan Stanley reportedly warning they may reach 8%, far above historical norms.

A second risk is liquidity pressure. Funds are restricting redemptions as investors rush for the exit, exposing the fragility of semi‑liquid structures.

Finally, contagion risk is growing because banks finance private‑credit funds and pipelines. As analysts note, deeper interconnections mean a downturn could transmit stress back into the regulated system.

Conclusion

Banks are reporting strong profits because the rate environment, public transfers, and capital strategies have created a uniquely favourable backdrop.

But the model is fragile: as impairments rise and rates eventually fall, the sector may be approaching the end of its profit‑supercycle.

Private credit – Banks Say “Contained” — Markets Aren’t So Sure

Private credit concerns

Private credit has become the fault line running beneath the banking system. And it’s now large enough to matter, opaque enough to worry investors, and now visible enough that banks can’t wave it away.

Complicated picture

European lenders spent this earnings season insisting their exposures are “well diversified” or “immaterial”, yet the numbers tell a more complicated story.

Barclays alone reportedly disclosed £15 billion of private‑credit exposure, part of a much larger £66 billion book tied to non‑bank financial intermediaries.

Its hit from the collapse of Market Financial Solutions — a specialist lender undone by alleged fraud — was small in accounting terms, but symbolically important. One cockroach rarely travels alone.

Structural

The deeper issue is structural. Private credit has ballooned into a parallel lending system, lightly regulated and increasingly interconnected with banks through financing lines, securitisations, and business‑development companies.

When these semi‑liquid vehicles face redemption pressure — as several have this year — the stress ricochets back into the banking system. UBS and Deutsche Bank both reportedly emphasised their underwriting standards, but neither disputed that liquidity strains are real.

What unnerves investors is not a wave of defaults — yet — but opacity. Bank of America’s latest survey shows investment‑grade investors are uneasy because they simply cannot see where the risks sit.

Software lending in the U.S., chemicals in Europe, and China‑driven price pressure all add sector‑specific fragility. High‑yield specialists, closer to the coalface, are oddly calmer; they know where the bodies usually fall.

Contained?

The banking system’s official line is that everything is contained. But containment depends on liquidity holding, valuations staying stable, and no further MFS‑style surprises emerging.

Private credit has grown faster than transparency, and faster than the regulatory perimeter. That mismatch — not any single default — is what now shadows the banks.

The issue

The central concern with private credit is simple: it has grown faster than the safeguards designed to contain it.

What was once a niche corner of finance is now a multi‑trillion‑pound shadow banking system whose risks are only partially visible to regulators, banks, or investors. That opacity is now becoming a problem.

Expansion

Private‑credit funds have expanded aggressively by offering speed, flexibility, and looser covenants than traditional banks. In a low‑rate world, that model looked benign. In a high‑rate world, it looks fragile.

Many borrowers were underwritten on assumptions that no longer hold: stable cashflows, cheap refinancing, and buoyant valuations. As rates stay elevated, those assumptions are breaking down.

Defaults

Defaults are rising, and recovery values are uncertain because loans are bespoke, illiquid, and rarely traded.

Liquidity

Liquidity is the second fault line. Private‑credit vehicles promise semi‑liquid access to investors while holding assets that cannot be sold quickly without taking a loss.

When redemptions pick up, funds resort to withdrawal gates, side pockets, or emergency financing lines from banks.

That is where the contagion risk emerges. Banks insist their exposures are modest, but they provide leverage, subscription lines, and warehousing facilities to the very funds now under pressure.

A liquidity squeeze in private credit can therefore boomerang back into the regulated system.

Valuation

Valuation risk is the third issue. Because loans are marked to model rather than market, losses can be slow to surface.

That delays recognition, masks stress, and encourages complacency. When reality finally intrudes — through a default, a refinancing failure, or a forced sale — the adjustment can be abrupt.

The final concern is concentration. Private credit is heavily exposed to software, healthcare, and sponsor‑backed roll‑ups. If one of these sectors turns, the losses will not be isolated.

Private credit is not about to collapse as such. But it is large, opaque, and increasingly interconnected — and that combination is rarely harmless.

China’s debt outlook downgraded by Moody’s as economy slows

Debt

A Downgrade Amidst Economic Slowdown

In a significant development that has raised concerns among investors and policymakers worldwide, China’s debt outlook has been downgraded as the country grapples with a slowing economy. This move reflects growing apprehensions about the sustainability of China’s economic growth and its ability to manage its burgeoning debt.

Moody’s issued the warning as it cut its outlook on the government’s debt to negative, from stable. China said it was disappointed by the move, calling the economy resilient. China also reported to have said it is unnecessary for Moody’s to worry about China’s economic growth prospects and fiscal sustainability.

Rapid Expansion

For years, China’s rapid economic expansion has been the engine of global growth, but recent trends indicate a deceleration. The once double-digit growth rates have now tapered, with projections suggesting a further slowdown in the coming years.

China exports

This deceleration is attributed to various factors, including trade tensions, demographic shifts, and a maturing economy.

Downgrade

The downgrade, announced by a prominent credit rating agency recently, underscores the risks associated with China’s increasing debt levels. The country’s total debt, which includes government, household, and corporate debt, has climbed to around 85%* of its GDP. This debt accumulation is partly due to the government’s efforts to stimulate the economy through infrastructure spending and lending to state-owned enterprises.

Property Sector

The property sector, a significant pillar of China’s economy, has also shown signs of strain. High-profile defaults and a cooling housing market have added to the concerns, prompting fears of a ripple effect across the economy. The government’s crackdown on excessive borrowing and speculative investments has further tightened liquidity, impacting developers and homeowners alike.

Debt
The burden of debt sits heavy in China’s property sector.

Response

In response to the downgrade, China’s finance ministry has expressed confidence in the country’s economic resilience. Officials argue that the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain strong, with continued efforts towards high-quality development and structural reforms. They assert that the concerns raised by the credit agencies are overstated and that China’s fiscal position remains robust.

Warning signal

Nevertheless, the downgrade should serve as a warning signal. It highlights the need for careful fiscal management and policy adjustments to navigate the challenges ahead. As the global economy faces uncertainty, the world will be closely watching how China addresses its debt dilemma and maintains its trajectory of growth.

This situation presents a complex puzzle for China’s leadership, balancing the goals of economic stability and sustainable development. The outcome will have far-reaching implications, not just for China but for the entire global economy.

The world awaits to see how China will write the next chapter in its remarkable economic story. If this goes wrong – it will go wrong in a big way.

Update Friday 8th December 2023

China’s top decision-making body of the ruling Communist Party on Friday said that the country’s fiscal policy ‘must be moderately strengthened’ to stimulate economic recovery, according to state-run news outlet. 

85%* debt to GDP ratio

China’s debt-to-GDP ratio was recorded at around 77% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product in 2022. This ratio is an important indicator of a country’s economic health, reflecting its ability to pay back its debts. This ratio has been on the rise in recent years, indicating an increase in national debt relative to the GDP. For instance, the ratio was around 23% in 2000 and grew to 34% in 2012, with a significant jump to the current level. 

China’s projected debt to GDP ration

Forecasts suggest that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio could reach 104% by 2028

It’s important to note that such figures can vary and should be interpreted within the context of each country’s economic structure and policies.